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In the decade leading to the recent commodity boom, which
peaked in 2007–08, several resource-rich, low-income coun-
tries displayed high rates of GDP growth while social indi-
cators did not improve significantly. It is well known that, in
itself, the widely tracked GDP may not be the most relevant
summary of aggregate economic performance in all places at
all times. This note suggests that for countries with signifi-
cant exhaustible natural resources and important foreign-in-
vestor presence, adjusted net national income (aNNI), can
usefully complement GDP to assess economic progress.1
As will be explained below, aNNI includes a charge to net
national income for the depletion of natural resources. Given
that “what gets measured gets managed,” there is a strong
case for routinely monitoring aNNI—and its related meas-
ure of adjusted net savings—especially in low-income, re-
source-rich economies, like many countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. 
It is useful to start with a preview of the different aggre-
gates that will be discussed in this note:
Net national income (NNI) = GDP + [Net foreign 
factor income] – [Depreciation of fixed capital]
Adjusted net national income (aNNI) = NNI – 
[Depreciation of natural capital]
Adjusted net savings (ANS) = aNNI – [Consumption]
+ [Foreign transfers] + [Education expenditures]
Let’s start by showing that the measures being contrast-
ed—GDP and aNNI—behave quite differently empirically.
Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of annual rates of real growth
of GDP against aNNI. The figure shows that these rates of
growth scatter very widely around the 45-degree line. They
are unequal more often than not, and can diverge substan-
tially for some countries in specific years. 
This divergence in growth rates can also be seen over
time. Figure 2, which displays average growth rates for Sub-
Saharan Africa, shows that growth rates of real aNNI are not
systematically lower than growth rates of real GDP. If any-
thing, there is a countercyclical tendency, with aNNI grow-
ing faster than GDP during a bust and slower during a
boom—reflecting the underlying changes in the quantity of
resource extracted and the unit resource rents.
Turning to levels, data for Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 3)
show that aNNI can give a strikingly different picture of
economic performance when compared with GDP.2 The fig-
ure shows that African countries have been consuming more
than their incomes since 1990, and particularly so through
much of the current resource boom. These facts suggest that
overconfidence in the future of resource-rich economies
GDP, the leading economic measurement, is outdated and misleading....It’s like grading a corporation based on
today’s cash flow and forgetting to depreciate assets and other costs. – Joseph Stiglitz, “Good Numbers Gone
Bad,” Fortune, October 2, 2006 may need to be revisited because it may be largely unjusti-
fied under current policies.
From GDP to National Wealth
The key to increasing future consumption and thus the stan-
dard of living lies in increasing national wealth, including not
only the traditional measures of capital (such as produced
and human capital), but also natural capital. Natural capital,
in turn, comprises assets such as land, forests, and subsoil re-
sources. All three types of capital—produced, human, and
natural—are key inputs to sustaining economic growth. 
However, as the Stiglitz quote on the first page of this
note points out, GDP does not account for the depreciation
of assets. Drawing down assets (of any kind) implies dissav-
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Source:  World Bank 2010.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Figure 1. Rates of Growth of Real GDP versus Real aNNI, 1990–2008
Figure 2. Growth Rates of GDP and aNNI in Sub-Saharan Africa,
1991–2008
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Figure 3. Consumption, GDP, and aNNI in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
1990–2008
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adjusted net national income (aNNI)ing. A recurring theme in this note is that national wealth
shrinks if the proceeds from drawing down an asset are not
invested.
Because increasing national wealth requires investment,
national savings—possibly complemented by foreign savings
transferred as aid—must be available to finance this invest-
ment.3 Here is where aNNI comes in, because it is the ulti-
mate source for funding these investments. First, national in-
come rather than domestic product is a more appropriate
income measure in countries where largely foreign-operated
extractive industries are substantial because payments to 
foreign-owned factors are often considerable.4 Second, in 
resource-rich countries, national income must be adjusted
by offsetting a part of the credits for resource extraction
with the corresponding depletion costs—these costs are sim-
ilar to capital depreciation.5
After adding net foreign factor income to GDP, and sub-
tracting the consumption of fixed and natural capital, we ob-
tain the country’s aNNI. This is a better measure of the
available income that can be consumed or invested to in-
crease the nation’s future consumption.6
Recognizing that resource depletion and environmental
degradation are types of depreciation—whereas education
expenditures increase a country’s human capital—Hamilton
and Clemens (1999) propose a measure of genuine savings.
This concept is formalized in the measurement of adjusted
net savings, which subtracts consumption from aNNI, adds
foreign transfers, and reclassifies education expenditures
from consumption to investment. See box 1 for illustrative
calculations.
The policy implications of measuring adjusted net savings
are quite direct: sustained negative savings lead to decreased
national wealth and diminished social welfare.
Adjusted Net Savings in Sub-Saharan Africa
versus East Asia: Divergence, Big Time
As figure 3 hints, a worrisome fact is that most resource-rich
countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region display small or neg-
ative adjusted net savings, even in the recent boom times. A
decade ago, Hamilton and Clemens (1999) noted the following:
The comparison of adjusted savings rates [across devel-
oping regions] reveals a disappointing trend for the
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa[...]. Equally impor-
tant, negative adjusted savings rates have been accom-
panied by persistently low regional indicators of hu-
man  welfare,  including  education,  nutrition,  and
medical care[...].The savings analysis highlights the fact
that the situation with regard to future well-being is worse
than might otherwise be thought: not only has Sub-Saha-
ran Africa performed badly by conventional measures, it
is clear that the wealth inherent in the resource stocks of
these countries is being liquidated and dissipated (p. 344;
emphasis added).
Figure 4 updates Hamilton and Clemens (1999), showing
a persistent downward trend in adjusted savings in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, with negative rates indicating wealth dissipation
through much of the recent resource boom. Total net wealth
creation in Sub-Saharan Africa was effectively zero from 1990
to 2007, a period when population grew by 60 percent.7
Figure 4 also suggests a substantial regional divergence in
saving rates—one that may drive future regional divergence
in income levels. East Asia is increasing national wealth sub-
stantially more rapidly than is Latin America, while Sub-Sa-
haran Africa is becoming poorer.
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Figure 4. Adjusted Net Savings as a Percentage of GNI for Selected Regions, 1970–2007 












































East Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan AfricaMany resource-rich countries display very low (and often
negative) rates of adjusted savings. In these cases, current
macroeconomic trajectories are unsustainable because they
imply shrinking national wealth. To reverse this trend, re-
source-rich countries need to (1) capture an efficient and
fair share of the resource rents for the government, and (2)
invest that share effectively to increase the nation’s wealth
(see box 2).8
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Box 1. Illustrative Examples—Computing National Wealth and Adjusted Savings
National Wealth—Table B.1 shows estimates of national wealth
for Peru, a middle-income, resource-rich country. Natural capital
is a relatively important component of Peru’s wealth, constituting
13 percent of total wealth—almost as much as produced capital
that accounts for 16 percent. Intangible capital (including hu-
man and social/institutional capital) accounts for 74 percent.
This pattern is qualitatively similar to the pattern found in many
resource-rich countries.
Adjusted Savings—Figure B.1 displays the calculation of adjusted
savings in Uzbekistan in 2008. The starting point is gross nation-
al savings, which includes net factor foreign income and net cur-
rent transfers (that is, remittances and aid). Consumption of
fixed capital is subtracted to obtain net national savings. Then
public current operating expenditures in education (including
wages and salaries and excluding capital investments in build-
ings and equipment) are added as investments in human capital,
before charges for the depletion of resources and pollution dam-
ages are applied to obtain adjusted savings. 
In table B.2, we explain the calculation of adjusted savings in
a mineral-rich economy. In the example we present, Zambia’s
saving rate for 2007 declines by nearly 30 percentage points—
from 26.2 percent to –3.0 percent of gross national income
(GNI) when depreciation of produced capital, depletion of natural
resources, and damage from global and local air pollutants are
taken into account. Particularly noteworthy is the mineral deple-
tion figure because copper rents play a key role in Zambia’s econ-
omy. Depletion of the mineral reserves, together with physical
capital depreciation and damages from pollution, are not being
completely offset by the economy’s saving effort—which in-
cludes full credit for education expenditure as a proxy for human
capital investments. The scale of resource rents as a share of GNI
in Uzbekistan is the most salient difference with respect to Zam-
bia’s adjusted savings calculation. The size of resource rents
tends to be more extreme in oil-rich countries than in mineral-
rich countries.
The depletion figures for Zambia do not include soil depletion
because information is not available. A large portion of Zambia’s
economy, however, depends on agricultural land resources: agri-
culture accounts for more than 15 percent of GDP. Deforestation
does not result in net forest depletion as a result of the natural
growth of a very large forested stock.
Per capita Percent of
wealth (US$) total wealth
Total wealth 44,912 100
Natural capital 5,823 13




Protected areas 603 1
Produced capital 7,160 16
Intangible capital 33,165 74
Net foreign assets –1,235 –3
Table B.1. Wealth Estimates for Peru, 2005
Source: World Bank 2010.
Percent of GNI
Gross savings 26.2
– Consumption of fixed capital 10.7
= Net national savings 15.5
+ Education expenditure 2.1
– Energy depletion 0.1
– Mineral depletion 19.8
– Net forest depletion 0.0
– Carbon dioxide damage 0.2
– Particulate emission damage 0.6
= Adjusted net savings –3.0
Table B.2. Calculation of Adjusted Savings for Zambia, 2007
Source: World Bank 2009a.
Figure B.1. Calculating Adjusted Savings for Uzbekistan, 2008
















































There is a long tradition of using GDP growth as a key per-
formance  indicator;  and  during  the  recent  commodity
boom, it has led to over-optimism in many low-income, re-
source-rich countries. In these countries, however, aNNI is a
better indicator of performance because it accounts both for
factor payments abroad and for depletion of natural re-
sources. Moreover, the strongest policy messages for re-
source-rich countries are often linked to the question of net
wealth creation, measured either narrowly as the difference
between aNNI and consumption or more broadly as adjust-
ed net savings. 
The wealth analysis suggests that a range of policies is
needed to ensure that mineral wealth is parlayed into sus-
tainable growth. These policies include macroeconomic poli-
cies that encourage saving, fiscal policies that capture re-
source rents, public investment programs that put resource
revenues to their best use (including investment in human
capital), and resource policies that lead to dynamically effi-
cient rates of extraction. Failure to implement sound policies
risks the “resource curse.” Atkinson and Hamilton (2003)
5 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Box 2. The Hartwick Rule
In the context of resource-rich countries, the Hartwick (1977)
rule dictates that the rents from natural-resource extraction
should be invested in reproducible capital to enjoy a constant
stream of consumption. The Hartwick rule is a reminder of the
old-fashioned obligation to “maintain capital intact.” When ad-
justed savings are negative, however, national capital is shrink-
ing. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) find that countries that es-
caped the resource curse used resource rents as a source of
investment rather than a source of public current expenditure.
These countries have been transforming natural capital into pro-
duced capital. 
Relating to this transformation of natural capital into pro-
duced capital, World Bank (2006) poses the following question:
How rich would countries be in the year 2000 had they followed
the Hartwick rule since 1970? Figure B.2 plots resource depend-
ence against the percentage difference between actual capital
accumulation and counterfactual capital accumulation. Coun-
tries in the top-right quadrant of the figure are resource depend-
ent, with a counterfactual capital stock that is higher than the
actual capital stock. These countries experienced declines in real
per capita income from 1970 to 2000—a tendency that is borne
out in recent research by Ferreira, Hamilton, and Vincent (2008).
Using panel data on savings and consumption, they show that
adjusted savings is robustly correlated with future changes in
consumption.1
Note
1. Ferreira and Vincent (2005) show, however, that the treatment
of human capital in adjusted net savings is not robust (presumably
because it measures gross rather than net investment and implic-
itly assumes that each dollar of government expenditure on edu-
cation creates one dollar of human capital). They also show that
the correlation between savings and future changes in consump-
tion holds for developing countries, but not for high-income coun-
tries. This finding arguably reflects the larger roles of knowledge
and technological change as sources of wealth in rich countries.
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Mauritania ￿
Gabon ￿
Algeria ￿ Congo, Rep. of ￿
Source: World Bank 2006, figure 4.1.show that countries with high resource abundance and neg-
ative rates of adjusted savings have suffered severely negative
growth consequences.
In practice, indicators of economic performance set the
stage for the policies that are considered. In resource-rich
countries, moving away from GDP-growth complacency
and focusing on aNNI and adjusted savings measures can
improve the focus of the policy discussion. When it is recog-
nized  that  negative  adjusted  savings  dissipates  national
wealth and translates into a poorer future, it becomes clear
that sustainable growth must be grounded on preserving and
increasing national wealth.
Botswana provides the example of the most successful
mineral-based economy in Africa. As Lange and Wright
(2004) report, the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning uses a “sustainable budget index” to ensure that re-
source revenues finance investments rather than consump-
tion. But Botswana’s success is based on more than imple-
menting the Hartwick rule. The government has paid close
attention to absorptive capacity and is willing to hold finan-
cial assets in a resource fund when competitive domestic in-
vestments are not available. The resource fund also helps
buffer Dutch disease effects and provides the basis for gov-
ernment to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies to smooth out
booms and busts.
Finally, it is important to avoid the mechanical use of any
indicator in policy formulation. Increasing savings implies
belt tightening, and cutting some government programs may
be especially harmful to poor people in the poorest coun-
tries. Reforms that boost returns on existing assets must be
part of the policy prescription in these countries, generating
a virtuous cycle of growth in income that can increase both
consumption and saving in the future.
Notes
1. The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report (2009) has strongly
recommended developing alternatives to GDP, including
more comprehensive measures of income and product, bet-
ter measures of well-being, and measures of net wealth cre-
ation to reflect the sustainability of income and well-being.
2. Note that Nigeria is excluded from figure 3 because of
data problems, and that not all countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa are rich in resources. 
3. In contrast, whereas foreign investment may increase
domestic wealth, it cannot directly increase national wealth
(although the indirect wealth effects of foreign investment
may sometimes be substantial).
4. That is not to say that extractive activities cannot con-
tribute to national wealth; indeed they can, by adequately
sharing rents with the government and employing national
factors (mostly labor), and through economic spillovers.
However, because direct employment is often of very little
significance and of poor quality, the taxation of rents is key
to transforming domestic production into national income.
5. These costs of depletion are now routinely reported in
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The “About
the Data” endnote to table 3.16 (World Bank 2010) pro-
vides a succinct summary of the methodology employed to
estimate depletion of natural resources.
6. Moreover, income- or consumption-based measures are
more relevant for welfare than are production-based indica-
tors (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972).
7. Chapter 5 of World Bank (2006) presents per capita
wealth accumulation figures in detail.
8. To a certain extent, a natural resource fund coupled
with an effective public investment management system has
the potential to address the three main problems associated
with natural resource wealth: (1) the Dutch disease (because
public investment increases the productivity of capital), (2)
volatility (because the resource fund enables a countercycli-
cal fiscal policy), and (3) political-economy issues (because
a transparent, rules-based system prevents mismanagement
of resources). 
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